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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by 
a federal court of appeals opinion between September 1, 2006 and 
January 31, 2007.  This collection is organized by civil and criminal 
matters, then by subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split.  It is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but will hopefully serve the reader well as a reference 
starting point. 
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CIVIL MATTERS 
CONSTITUTIONAL/FEDERAL LAW 
 
 
Copyright Affirmative Defenses – Laches: Chirco v. Crosswinds 
Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 
The 6th Circuit held that laches can be argued as an affirmative 
defense in copyright actions. Id. at 229. The court agreed with the 7th 
Circuit’s conclusion that “a flat proscription such as that invoked by the 
[4th] Circuit against the defense of laches in cases involving a federal 
statutory claim is both unnecessary and unwise.” Id. at 233-34. The court 
held that “laches can be argued ‘regardless of whether the suit is at law 
or in equity, because, as with many equitable defenses, the defense of 
laches is equally available in suits at law’”. Id. 
 
 
Political Question Doctrine – Holocaust Survivor Claims: 
Rozenkier v. AG Shering, 196 Fed. App’x 93 (3d Cir. 2006) 
 
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issue of whether the claims of a 
Holocaust survivor against German corporations alleged to have 
cooperated with the Nazi government “are nonjusticiable under the 
political question doctrine. . . .” Id. at 94. The court held that “the 
adjudication of Nazi-era claims by United States federal courts would 
express a lack of respect for . . . the Executive Branch’s longstanding 
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foreign policy interest that issues relating to World War II and Nazi-era 
claims be resolved through intergovernmental negotiation.” Id. at 98. In 
reaching this holding, the court took note of an Executive Agreement 
between the United States and Germany that memorialized a 1998 
compromise in which “the federal governments of the United States and 
Germany, German corporations, and attorneys for various plaintiffs 
agreed that the plaintiffs would voluntarily dismiss their lawsuits in 
exchange for the creation of [a] German Foundation  . . . which would 
make payments to Nazi victims from a DM 10 billion pool.” Id. at 95. 
The court observed that its interpretation of the political question 
doctrine conflicted with the interpretation of the 11th Circuit, which had 
“reasoned that because the Executive Agreement, which is the same as 
that at issue here, stated that it did not provide an independent legal basis 
for dismissal, the ‘President has purposely chosen not to settle [the] 
claims directly’ and therefore adjudication of the claims does not 
‘interfere with American foreign relations.’” Id. at 101. The court 
disagreed with the 11th Circuit because “that language does not preclude 
United States federal courts from dismissing claims arising under the 
Executive Agreement as raising a nonjusticiable political question.” 
Rozenkier, 196 Fed. Appx. at 101. 
 
 
Municipal Boards of Education Liability – But For Test: 
Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 
2006) 
 
The 6th Circuit held that the proper test for determining whether “a 
[municipal board of education], rather than its members, acts with 
improper motive,” is a “but for” test. Id. at 262. The 6th Circuit noted 
that the 1st Circuit held that board liability existed only “where the 
plaintiff established both: ‘(a) bad motive on the part of at least a 
significant block of legislators, and (b) circumstances suggesting the 
probable complicity of others.’” Id. The court found that such a test 
would be “difficult to apply, because it leaves many questions 
unanswered. Among the most important of these is what constitutes a 
‘significant block of legislators’ or ‘circumstances suggesting the 
probable complicity of others.’” Id. The court explained that under the 
test implied by the 2nd, 3rd, and 9th Circuits, “a board is liable for 
actions that it would not have taken ‘but for’ members acting with 
improper motive.” Id. The 6th Circuit found this test to be more in line 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle. Id. For those reasons, the 6th Circuit adopted the “but 
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for” test to determine whether a municipal board of education, as 
opposed to its members, acted with an improper motive. Id. at 263. 
 
 
Choice of Law – CERCLA: New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 460 
F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2006) 
 
The 2nd Circuit discussed whether state law or federal common law 
governs when considering corporate successor liability for the purposes 
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”). Id. at 203. Although the issue was 
irrelevant to the ultimate holding and the court had already decided in 
B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996), that federal 
common law applied in these instances, that decision had subsequently 
been overruled. Id. at 207. Accordingly, the court articulated the test for 
determining whether to apply federal common law rather than state law 
as, “(1) whether the federal program, by its very nature, requires 
uniformity; (2) whether application of state law would frustrate specific 
objectives of the federal program; and (3) whether application of a 
uniform federal rule would disrupt existing commercial relationships 
based on state law.” Id. The court noted that the 1st, 6th, 9th, and 11th 
Circuits found no conflict with applying state law in these CERCLA 
cases. Id. at 207-08. In contrast, the 3rd and 4th Circuits found a national 
rule to be in order in CERCLA cases. Id. The court ultimately applied the 
Betkoski standard and found, along with the 1st, 6th, 9th, and 11th 
Circuits, that there is “no conflict between the application of state law 
and the federal interests at issue in CERCLA, and we fail to see one.” Id. 
at 208. 
 
 
Fair Housing Act – Standards for Discrimination: Cmty. House, 
Inc. v. City of Boise, 468 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 9th Circuit noted that it had “not previously adopted a standard 
for determining the propriety or acceptability of justifications for facial 
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.” Id. at 1125. Recognizing a 
circuit split over the issue, the court first stated that the 8th Circuit uses 
“the same standard for analyzing a defendant’s rationales in challenges 
under the Fair Housing Act as it applies to claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause.” Id. The court then stated that the standard employed 
by the 6th and 10th Circuits require defendants to show either “(1) that 
the restriction benefits the protected class or (2) that it responds to 
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legitimate safety concerns raised by the individuals affected, rather than 
being based on stereotypes.” Id. In rejecting the 8th Circuit’s approach, 
and adopting the standard used by the 6th and 10th Circuits, the court 
reasoned that, “the Eighth Circuit’s approach is inappropriate for Fair 
Housing Act claims because some classes of persons specifically 
protected by the Fair Housing Act, such as families and the handicapped, 
are not protected classes for constitutional purposes.” Id. at 1125-26. 
 
 
Scope of Law – Court Regulation of Abusive Litigant Behavior: 
Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Assoc., 469 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir. 2006) 
 
Appellant appealed the district court’s order prohibiting the 
commencement of “any pro se litigation in any court in the United States 
on any subject matter unless” appellant is represented by a lawyer or has 
received specific court approval. Id. at 1344. Appellant argued that this 
order was too broad and was not an exercise of “carefully tailored 
restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.” Id. at 1343. On appeal, 
appellee cited a 2nd Circuit case supporting their “argument that the 
breadth of the district court’s order was appropriate.” Id. at 1344. The 
10th Circuit disagreed “with the Second Circuit’s decision to uphold the 
broad filing restriction limiting access to any federal district court in the 
country. . . .” Id. The court held that “it is not appropriate to extend those 
restriction to include federal district courts outside of [appellant’s] 
Circuit.” Id. The court noted that “it is not reasonable for a court in this 
Circuit to speak on behalf of courts in other circuits in the country.” Id. 
 
 
Zoning – Sexually Oriented Businesses: Doctor John’s, Inc. v. 
City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 10th Circuit addressed the constitutionality of “an ordinance 
subjecting ‘sexually oriented businesses’ to certain regulations.” Id. at 
1153. The 5th Circuit held that “an ordinance which regulated both on-
site and off-site adult businesses was not narrowly tailored because the 
City failed, as a threshold matter, to provide evidence that off-site 
businesses caused negative secondary effects.” Id. at 1166. However, the 
10th Circuit explicitly “rejected the on-site/off-site distinction as a basis 
for striking down an adult business ordinance as an unconstitutional 
time/place/manner restriction.” Id. at 1167. The 10th Circuit disagreed 
with its sister circuit and, instead, held that “the mere fact that the 
ordinance reaches off-site as well as on-site businesses is insufficient for 
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us to declare the ordinance unconstitutional.” Id. The court concluded 
that the appellant’s argument “concerning on-site and off-site businesses 
fail[ed] to ‘cast direct doubt’ on the City’s rationale.” Id. at 1168. 
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
 
 
Service of Process – Rule 4(m) Extension: United States v. 
McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 7th Circuit decided the effect of Rule 6(b)(2) on Rule 4(m) 
regarding service of process on a defendant where the 120-day notice 
requirement had lapsed and the plaintiff then sought an extension. Id. at 
700. The court offered that “some courts,” including the 5th and 6th 
Circuits, automatically apply the “excusable neglect” standard from Rule 
6(b)(2) to all Rule 4(m) requests for an extension where the motion is 
made after the lapse. Id. The court explained that this would mean that a 
plaintiff who missed the original deadline and failed to file an extension 
before the expiration of that 120-day period would need to show 
excusable neglect in order to have the motion granted. Id. The 7th 
Circuit, however, read Rule 6(b)(2) to only be implicated after a district 
court had applied Rule 4(m), specifying a new period of time. Id. The 
court further held that once the plaintiff did not meet the new deadline, 
and subsequently filed a motion to extend that time period, only then 
would Rule 6(b)(2) “come into play.” Id. 
 
 
IMMIGRATION 
 
 
Jurisdictional Limitations – Streamline Review Process: Gutnik 
v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 7th Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to review a 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision to commit an appeal to 
streamlined procedures. Id. at 690. The defendant argued that his case 
was improperly subjected to the streamline review process because there 
is no prior BIA or federal court precedent on point for the legal issue 
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raised by his case. Id. The court noted that “as a result, his case falls 
within one of the exceptions set forth in the streamlining regulations at 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(6) such that his appeal of the IJ’s decision should 
have been reviewed by a three-member BIA panel.” Id. Circuits have 
split on the jurisdictional question, with the 2nd, 8th, and 10th Circuits 
finding no jurisdiction and the 1st, 3rd, and 9th Circuits finding for a 
remand to a three member BIA panel review. Id. at 691. The court joined 
with the 2nd, 8th, and 10th Circuits in finding no jurisdiction on the 
grounds that finding otherwise would only exacerbate an already 
overburdened case load. Id. at 692. 
 
 
LABOR LAW 
 
 
Collective Bargaining Agreements – Scope of Arbitration 
Clauses: United Steelworkers of America v. Cooper Tire & Rubber 
Co., 474 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of “whether a dispute over a 
side agreement that does not provide for arbitration falls within the 
CBA’s [collective bargaining agreement’s] arbitration clause . . . .” Id. at 
278. The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, and 8th Circuits apply the 
collateral test, which requires that “courts consider the similarity of the 
side agreement’s subject matter to the subject matter of the CBA,” and 
“[i]f the subject matter is dissimilar, the side agreement is deemed 
collateral to the CBA.” Id. Under the collateral test, “where the side 
agreement is ‘integral’ to the CBA, courts permit arbitration of disputes 
over its provisions.” Id. In contrast, the court noted that the 3rd, 7th, and 
9th Circuits apply the scope test, which requires that “unless the parties 
indicate otherwise, disputes over a side agreement are arbitrable if the 
subject matter of the side agreement is within the scope of the CBA’s 
arbitration clause.” Id. at 278-79. The 6th Circuit adopted the 9th 
Circuit’s interpretation of the scope test. Id. The court held that “[i]n 
determining the arbitrability of side letters and side agreements, we begin 
our inquiry by analyzing the CBA’s arbitration clause.” Id. at 279. The 
court went on to explain that “[w]ith the scope of the arbitration clause in 
mind, we then look to the subject matter of the side agreement to 
determine if it falls within the clause’s intended coverage.” Id. 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
 
Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 – Benefits 
Formula: A. T. Massey Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 472 F.3d 148 (4th 
Cir. 2006) 
 
The 4th Circuit considered the merits of a suit brought by several 
hundred members or affiliates of the coal industry to determine the 
meaning of the word “reimbursements” as used in a premiums formula 
under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (“the Coal 
Act”). Id. at 154. The court explained that the premiums formula dictates 
the premiums that coal operators are to pay into the common fund for 
each beneficiary on the basis of, inter alia, payments made to 
beneficiaries in a base year, minus “‘reimbursements’ received from 
Medicare and other publicly financed programs for the base year . . . .” 
Id. at 153. The court then explained that the issue is whether 
“‘reimbursements’ . . . includes the total payments that Medicare made    
. . . ($182.3 million) or only the amount that the [fund] actually paid out 
in Medicare benefits to beneficiaries . . . ($156.3 million).”  Id. at 154. 
The court discussed how negotiations prior to the passage of the Coal 
Act between Medicare and the Plans to simplify the reasonable cost 
methodology resulted in the adoption of a capitated method. Id. at 155-
57. With this background, the court stated that “‘reimbursements’ . . . has 
a statutory context and historical context, and both reveal a uniform and 
precise meaning of the term . . . history shows that the method of 
reimbursement adopted from the reimbursements made [under the 
capitation method] was a purposeful act, . . . which Congress 
incorporated by reference in the Coal Act.” Id. at 160, 162. From this, the 
court concluded that “‘reimbursements’ is an unambiguous historical 
term of art used by Congress to refer to the total reimbursements that 
Medicare actually made, using a capitation method.” Id. at 154. The 
court thus sided with the 11th Circuit in a split between that circuit and 
the D.C. Circuit.  Id. at 154 n.2. 
 
 
Medicare – Immunity Provision: United States ex rel. Sikkenga  
v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 
2006) 
 
The 10th Circuit faced, in part, a question of statutory 
interpretation. Id. at 710. Appellant had alleged that the Medicare carrier 
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for the State of Utah “presented false Medicare claims to the 
Government” and “submitted a false budget payment request to . . . the 
agency that manages Medicare.” Id. at 705. Under the Medicare statutory 
scheme pursuant to 42. U.S.C. § 1395(u)(e), Congress granted immunity 
to a Medicare contractor’s payment of a claim. Id. at 709. The 11th 
Circuit had previously interpreted this immunity provision to have 
“unambiguously provided absolute immunity to Medicare” contractors. 
Id. The 10th Circuit disagreed with its sister circuit’s interpretation. Id. at 
710. In contrast, the court construed the immunity provision to not 
provide absolute immunity, but rather that “the immunity excludes cases 
involving fraud and gross negligence.” Id. at 711. The 10th Circuit found 
support for this interpretation within the legislative history. Id. Although 
the district court had relied on the 11th Circuit’s interpretation, the 10th 
Circuit affirmed this portion of the district court’s decision based on 
other specific procedural issues. Id. at 712. 
 
 
Longshore Act – Requirements to Obtain Attorney’s Fees: 
Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. Dir., 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 
2007) 
 
The 6th Circuit held that 33 U.S.C. § 928(b) requires a written 
recommendation by the district director in order for the plaintiff to 
recover attorney’s fees pursuant to a claim under the Longshore Act. Id. 
at 265. The 6th Circuit explained that the 9th Circuit “has routinely held 
employers liable for attorney’s fees under subsection (b) even when the 
literal terms of the statute [have] not been met.” Id. The court also 
explained that both the 4th and 5th Circuits “required that each of the 
requirements set forth in subsection (b) be met before an employer incurs 
liability for attorney’s fees.” Id. The 6th Circuit agreed with both the 4th 
and 5th Circuits, emphasizing that these circuits had relied on the 
statutory construction in coming to this conclusion. Id. at 266. The court 
found “little, if any, support for the Ninth Circuit’s position, even in the 
legislative history,” which the 9th Circuit had so heavily relied on in its 
decision. Id. at 267. The 6th Circuit concluded that all of the 
requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 928(b) must be met before an employer will 
incur liability for attorney’s fees under the Longshore Act. 
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Tax – Deduction of Investment-Advice Fees for Trusts: William 
L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 
2006) 
 
The 2nd Circuit addressed the issue of “whether investment-advice 
fees incurred by a trust are fully deductible in calculating adjusted gross 
income for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) under 26 
U.S.C. § 67(e)(1)(2000), or whether these fees are deductible only to the 
extent that they exceed two percent of the trust’s adjusted gross income 
under § 67(a).” Id. at 150-51. The court explained that under § 67(e)(1), 
“[a] trust’s costs are fully deductible, rather than subject to the two-
percent floor, if they satisfy both of the following two requirements: (1) 
they are ‘paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the . . . 
trust’; and (2) they ‘would not have been incurred if the property were 
not held in such trust.’” Id. at 153. The court observed that the 6th 
Circuit disagreed with the Federal Circuit and the 4th Circuit on whether 
investment-advice fees meet § 67(e)(1)’s second requirement. Id. at 153-
54. The court elected to join the Federal Circuit and the 4th Circuit, and 
held that investment-advice fees fail the second requirement. Id. at 156. 
The court stated that its “conclusion follows from the fact that individual 
property owners obviously can incur investment-advice fees and from 
the regulation explicitly including investment-advice fees among an 
individual’s miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to § 67(a)’s two-
percent floor.” Id. at 160. 
 
 
Employment – Title VII Claim Preclusion: Nestor v. Pratt & 
Whitney, 466 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006) 
 
The 2nd Circuit decided the issue of “whether a Title VII plaintiff 
who prevailed on her discrimination claims before a state administrative 
agency and in appeals of the agency decision to state court can 
subsequently file suit in federal court seeking relief that was unavailable 
in the state proceedings.” Id. at 69. The court observed that this issue 
created a split between the 7th and 8th Circuits, which held that such 
federal claims were not precluded, and the 4th Circuit, which held that 
such federal claims are precluded. Id. The court ruled that its “usual 
approach to preemption is . . . seemingly inapplicable” in the Title VII 
context because “Title VII permits a claimant to seek—in federal court—
’supplemental’ relief that was unavailable in the state court.” Id. at 71-
72. The court joined the 7th and 8th Circuits in holding that Title VII 
claims filed in federal court seeking supplemental remedies unavailable 
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in state court were not precluded by the prior litigation of such claims in 
state court. Id. at 72. 
 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act – Time Barred?: Margolies v. Deason, 464 
F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 8th Circuits have considered the issue of 
whether causes of action arising prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 are time barred. Id. at 551. These circuits agree that 
the Act did not revive previously extinguished causes of action. Id. The 
11th Circuit disagreed with the other circuits in Tello v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2005) finding that statutes that 
are unambiguous on retroactivity should be retroactively applied. Id. 
Here, the 5th Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits in holding that 
the Act did not apply retroactively to revive the pre-Act causes of action. 
Id. 
 
 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 – 
State Valuation Methodology: CSX Transp., Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 472 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 11th Circuit held that “railroads may not challenge state 
[property tax] valuation methodologies under subsection (b)(1) [of the 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act)].” 
Id. at 1289. The court adopted the 4th Circuit’s view on this issue, which 
is in direct conflict with the views of the 2nd and 9th Circuits. Id. at 
1287-88. The 11th Circuit explained that “[i]t is a well-settled principle 
of statutory interpretation that a statute will not be construed to burden 
states in the exercise of their traditional powers unless it clearly states its 
intent to do so.” Id. at 1288. Additionally, the court was influenced by 
Supreme Court precedent that “has ‘long recognized that principles of 
federalism and comity generally counsel that courts should adopt a 
hands-off approach with respect to state tax administration.’” Id. at 1288-
89. 
 
 
ERISA – Delegating Fiduciary Authority: Geddes v. United 
Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan., 469 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 
2006) 
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In choosing to apply deferential review to benefits claims under an 
arbitrary and capricious standard, the 10th Circuit rejected the logic 
embraced by the 11th Circuit. Id. at 926-27. Instead of reserving 
deferential review for cases in which an ERISA plan administrator 
delegates its authority to other explicit fiduciaries, the court explained 
that the plain language of ERISA and trust law empowered named 
fiduciaries to delegate their authority to independent, non-fiduciary third 
parties. Id. at 927. The court then reasoned that those third parties acted 
as agents of the fiduciary, and consequently held that a plan 
administrator allotted discretionary authority through a benefits plan was 
entitled to judicial deference for any decisions made by a third party. Id. 
 
 
RICO – Personal Jurisdiction: Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 
F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 10th Circuit joined the 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits in holding 
that section 1965(b) of the RICO statute, “when raised in the proper 
venue, extends personal jurisdiction into ‘any judicial district of the 
United States’ if necessary to satisfy ‘the ends of justice.’” Id. at 1229. In 
contrast with the 4th and 11th Circuits, the court considered section 
1965(d) of the statute only for guidance on personal jurisdiction 
regarding service of process that was not a summons or a government 
subpoena. Id. at 1230. The court relied on other circuits’ readings of the 
statute in conjunction with the legislative history and the body of 
antitrust legislation to conclude that section (b) was the proper provision 
for nationwide service of process on parties outside of the district using 
personal jurisdiction based on the “ends of justice” test. Id. at 1231. 
 
 
§ 11 and § 12(a)(2) Securities Claims – Pleading with 
Particularity: Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 
1273 (11th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 11th Circuit referred to §§ 11 and 12(a)(2) securities as 
“nonfraud claims” and considered “whether there are circumstances 
when FED. R. CIV. PROC. 9(b) would require nonfraud securities claims 
to be pled with particularity.” Id. at 1277. The court found that “[t]he 
purpose of the rule is to protect a defendant’s good will and reputation 
when that defendant’s conduct is alleged to be fraudulent.” Id. at 1278. 
Therefore, the court decided that Rule 9(b) does apply in “nonfraud” 
claims and that such claims must be pled with particularity, agreeing 
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with the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits, but opposing the 8th Circuit. Id. 
at 1277. 
 
 
Medicaid Act – Meaning of the Term “Assistance”: Mandy R. v. 
Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 10th Circuit agreed with the 6th and 7th Circuits’ definition of 
the phrase “medical assistance” in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) of the Medicaid 
Act. Id. at 1143. The court found that “the statutory reference to 
‘assistance’ appears to have reference to financial assistance rather than 
to actual medical services.” Id. The 10th Circuit reasoned that the 
Medicaid statute does not require states to be service-providers of last 
resort.” Id. at 1146. Noting that the existence of a circuit “split is not 
entirely clear,” the 10th Circuit suggested that a circuit split may exist as 
to “whether ‘medical assistance’ requires a state to provide actual 
services.” Id. at 1143 n.2. This ruling is in dispute with the 
determinations of the 1st and 11th Circuits. Id. 
 
 
Administrative Expense Priority – Collective Bargaining 
Agreements: Peters v. Pikes Peak Musicians Ass’n, 462 F.3d 1265 
(10th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 10th Circuit joined the majority of circuits in “limit[ing] the 
administrative expense priority provided in [11 U.S.C.] § 507 to claims 
that meet the textual requirements of [11 U.S.C.] § 503, even in cases 
that arise under collective bargaining agreements that implicate [11 
U.S.C.] § 1113.” Id. at 1269-70. The 6th Circuit and several district 
courts follow the minority approach which hold that “the remedial 
purpose of § 1113 trumped the literal language of § 503, thus entitling 
parties to administrative expense priority under § 507 for claims filed 
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, even where the 
requirements of § 503 had not been satisfied.” Id. at 1269. In adopting 
the majority approach, the 10th Circuit quoted the 3rd Circuit’s 
reasoning, that “if Congress had wished to create an automatic priority 
for collective bargaining agreement claims, it would have been similarly 
explicit in [§] 1113. Conversely, its failure to do so should counsel 
against a court’s attempts to read such requirements into the statute.” Id. 
at 1270. 
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CRIMINAL MATTERS 
SENTENCING 
 
 
 
Appeals – Finality of Judgment: Burrell v. United States, 467 
F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006) 
 
The 2nd Circuit addressed the issue of “whether a criminal 
judgment is final when we have affirmed a defendant’s conviction and 
sentence on at least one count, but remanded for the district court to 
dismiss the defendant’s conviction and sentence on another count.” Id. at 
163. The court noted that a split on this issue exists between the 4th 
Circuit, which held that “finality is not delayed if an appellate court 
disposes of all counts in a judgment of conviction but remands for a 
ministerial purpose that could not result in a valid second appeal[,]” 
United States v. Dodson, 291 F.3d 268, 275 (4th Cir. 2002), and the 9th 
Circuit, which held that “a judgment is not final if the appellate court 
reverses any portion of the district court’s judgment and remands to the 
district court, even if the remand is only ministerial. . . .” Id. at 168. The 
court sided with the 4th Circuit, and held that “a remand for ministerial 
purposes, such as the correction of language in a judgment or the entry of 
a judgment in accordance with a mandate, does not delay a judgment’s 
finality.” Id. at 166. 
 
 
Post-Booker – Sentencing Ration Guidelines: United States v. 
Castillo, 460 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2006) 
 
The 2nd Circuit decided whether the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) meant that district courts 
were free to calculate sentences for drug crimes using a ratio other than 
the 100:1 ratio provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). Id. at 353. The court 
noted that the 7th and 8th Circuits have held that district courts have 
discretion to deviate from the guideline ratio, provided they do not 
exceed it. Id. On the other hand, the 1st, 4th, and 11th Circuits have 
decided that district courts must conform to the 100:1 ratio guideline. Id. 
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The circuit court stressed the differences between § 3553(a)(2), which 
lays out policy factors to consider in sentencing, and § 3553(a)(4), which 
establishes the sentence categories and their respective ranges. Id. at 355. 
Looking at the language of the statute, the legislative history of the 
statute, and the history of the guidelines, the 2nd Circuit concluded that, 
while a district court has discretion to consider the policy factors laid out 
in § 3553(a)(2), it cannot create its own ratio, but must sentence within 
the established ratio of the guidelines promulgated in § 3553(a)(4), 
despite any disparity in sentencing this approach may create. Id. at 361. 
 
 
Guidelines – Calculating the Sentencing Range: United States v. 
Jackson, 467 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 2006) 
 
In this case, the 3rd Circuit determined that “district courts must 
still calculate what the proper Guidelines sentencing range is,” and as 
such, the court stressed “that the entirety of the Guidelines calculation be 
done correctly, including rulings on Guidelines departures.” Id. at 838-
39. The court noted its departure from the 7th and 9th Circuits, “which 
have ruled Guidelines departures obsolete in the wake of Booker.” Id. at 
839. Moreover, the court noted that “[a]t least six other circuits 
essentially employ the same approach to departures . . . and one other has 
fashioned a modified (but continuing) role for Guidelines departures.” Id. 
The court stated that its determination was “not for jurisdictional reasons, 
but rather because the . . . Guidelines still play in integral role in criminal 
sentencing.” Id. at 838. 
 
 
Armed Career Criminal Act – Taylor and Meaning of 
“Unlawful or Unprivileged” Entry for Generic Burglary: 
United States v. Bennett, 469 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2006) 
 
The 1st Circuit recognized the split that exists between circuits over 
the “unlawful or unprivileged” element of generic burglary defined by 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Taylor, for purposes of sentencing 
enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Id. at 50. The court 
indicated that the 4th Circuit, in United States v. Bowden, held that one 
who “enters without breaking with intent to commit a felony or larceny is 
neither lawful nor privileged” and thus falls under Taylor. Id. The 6th 
Circuit, however, in United States v. Maness, stated that the statute 
addressed in Bowden does not meet the definition of “generic burglary” 
set forth in Taylor, because “intent to commit a crime is a ‘separate and 
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distinct element[]’ from unlawful or unprivileged entry.” Id. Because this 
issue was not raised below, the 1st Circuit reviewed only for clear error. 
Id. at 50-51. 
 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
 
 
Post-Conviction – Access to Physical Evidence: Savory v. Lyons, 
469 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th and 11th circuits have considered whether a 
claim for post-conviction access to physical evidence is cognizable under 
§ 1983. Id. at 671. The 11th Circuit, having expressly disagreed with the 
4th Circuit approach in Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002), 
found that access to the evidence is proper. Id. The court in that case 
reasoned that testing of evidence for DNA can be either exculpatory or 
inculpatory and is not a direct or indirect attack on the conviction or 
sentence. Id. The 9th Circuit has also joined the 11th Circuit’s approach 
in Bradley. Id. The 4th and 5th Circuits were concerned that the 
defendant would use his claim to access evidence in preparation for a 
future challenge to his incarceration. Id. In an unpublished opinion the 
6th Circuit espoused this view as well. Id. Here, the 7th Circuit joined the 
9th and 11th in its interpretation. Id. at 672. It found that granting the 
defendant access to the evidence “would not imply the invalidity of his 
conviction.” Id. Nor would it “demonstrate the invalidity of any 
outstanding criminal judgment against him and will not unduly intrude 
upon the territory of core habeas corpus relief.” Id. 
 
 
Due Process – An Inmate’s Liberty Interest During Segregation 
in Prison: Jordan v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 191 Fed. App’x 639 
(10th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 10th Circuit contemplated two splits at issue among the circuit 
courts and held that an inmate’s five-year administrative detention did 
not create a constitutionally-recognizable liberty interest subject to 
procedural due process protections. Id. at 650-51. The court noted that 
the Supreme Court had not decided whether an examination of the 
conditions, durations, or restrictions of prison confinement should utilize 
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a baseline comparison between inmates in the same segregation, or those 
from the general prison population. Id. at 652. The circumstances of the 
case led the court to find that the conditions of segregation were 
“comparable to those of general population inmates” and rejected the 
appellant’s argument that his restrictions of confinement presented an 
“atypical and significant hardship.” Id. The court agreed with the 6th 
Circuit that segregation was not atypical for an inmate whose 
participation in violent conduct while in prison was being investigated. 
Id. at 653. Further, the court agreed that it was reasonable for prison 
officials to adjust conditions of imprisonment while the investigation was 
pending. Id. Stating that a “majority of other circuits have also held no 
liberty interest arose in administrative detentions presented on appeal, 
while a few others have rendered contrary decisions,” the 10th Circuit 
denied the appellant’s argument that the segregation violated a liberty 
interest, reasoning that due process rights of prisoners were subject to 
reasonable limitation given the institution’s legitimate security concerns. 
Id. 
 
 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
 
 
Court Rules – Imposing an Upward Variance: United States v. 
Cousins, 469 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2006) 
 
In this case, the 6th Circuit held that FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 32(h), 
which requires that courts give notice of “its intention to impose an 
upwards variance,” applies to all sentences that deviate from the 
sentencing guidelines. Id. at 574, 580. The 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 11th 
Circuits have all held that Rule 32(h) does not apply to sentences which 
vary, rather than deviate, from the guidelines. Id. at 580. The 4th, 9th, 
and 10th Circuits have held that Rule 32(h) applies to all non-guidelines 
sentences. Id. The 6th Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the 4th, 9th, 
and 10th Circuits. Id. The court explained that the departure criteria of 
“Chapter 5 of the Guidelines, like § 3553(a), specifically identifies 
various factors that a court should take into consideration when deciding 
whether or not to grant a departure.” Id. The 6th Circuit could not 
“discern any distinction between the [Chapter 5] departure criteria and 
the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. Accordingly, the court held that Rule 32(h) 
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applies to all variances from the sentencing guidelines under Chapter 5 
and § 3553(a). Id. 
